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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD 
COMMISSION, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGE KENDELL and IRENE H. KEN-
DELL, his wife; EARL M. KENDELL, and Case No. 
FLORA H. KENDELL, his wife; RULON 10834 
E. WILLIAMS and VIOLA R. WILLIAMS. 
his wife; and UTAH SAND AND GRAVEL 
PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Utah cor-
poration, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, State of Utah, appeals from a judg-
ment of the trial court entered pursuant to a jury 
verdict awarding respondents $59,500.00 for the 
taking of their property at Kendall Junction, Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests this court to reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and grant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 24, 1964, the respondent filed with the 
2 
Weber County Clerk a complaint with the attached 
condemnation resolution praying for a judgment of 
condemnation and requesting an adiudication as to 
the amount to be paid to defendants as just com-
pensation for the acquisition. 
A trial was held and pursuant to a jury verdict 
and following a motion for remittance and alterna-
tively a new trial a judgment was entered for $59,-
500.00 for defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY WERE 
CLEARLY EXCESSIVE IN LAW AND UNDER THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED, AND THE VERDICT IS 
AGAINST THE CLEAR AND MANIFEST WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE AND AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD 
BE SHOCKING TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT, 
AND SAID VERDICT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN 
GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PREJUDICE 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF. 
It is submitted that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in refusing to grant a remittitur because the 
amount of damages in and of themselves indicate 
the award was made under the influence of passion 
or prejudice. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, justifies 
a trial court in ordering a new trial or an amend-
ment of a judgment where the damages are in-
correct. 
Rule 59(a) provides as follows insofar as is ap-
plicable here: 
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"(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
61, a new trial may be granted ... for any 
of the following reasons: 
* * * 
" ( 5) Excessive or inadequate damages ap-
pearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
" ( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or alter decision or that it 
is against the law. 
"(7) Error in law." 
The case of Geary v. Cain. 69 U. 340, 255 P. 416 
(i 927) construes this rule as a grant of authority to 
the trial court to order a remittitur where the amount 
of damages in and of themselves constitute the sole 
evidence that said award was made under the in-
fluence of passion or prejudke. See also in this con-
nection Jensen v. Railroad Co .. 44 U. 100, 138 P. 1185. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
AN INSTRUCTION PERTAINING TO THE RIGHT OR 
LACK THEREOF OF A PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNER 
TO HAVE A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE ADJACENT TO 
HIS PROPERTY. 
The case of Robinette v. Price. 74 Ut. 512, 280 
P. 736 ( 1929) is a very similar fact situation and stands 
for the principle set forth above. In that case an ac-
tion was brought to recover damages alleged to 
have resulted to a property owner from the closing 
and discontinuance of a public thoroughfare in Price 
City, Utah. The evidence showed that the street on 
which Plaintiff's parcel abutted, prior to the time of 
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its discontinuance, gave Plaintiff a direct route to 
Plaintiff's business. Following the discontinuance 
the Plaintiff was required to travel about nine-tenth~ 
of a mile in a circuitous route from his property to 
the main business portion of the city. It was then 
claimed by Plaintiff that the termination of the street 
depreciated the value of his property and rendered 
the rental of his building maintained thereon more 
difficult, and greatly decreased the rental value of 
it. The Court stated in response to this claim: 
"Though the travel over Ninth street is somewhat 
more inconvenient in going to and from Plaintiff's 
property to Main street and to the business portion 
of the city than was the former route enjoyed by 
him, and though the value of the rental of his prop-
erty may have, as contended by him, been de-
creased by such a change of route, yet such incon-
venience and injury are not in kind and degree spe·· 
cial, entitling the Plaintiff to compensation for re-
sulting loss or injury occasioned thereby. (citing 
cases.)" 
The law in the Robinette case has been recently 
applied by the Utah Supreme Court in Springville 
Banking Company v. Burton, 10 Ut. 2d 100, 349 P.2d 
157. The facts of that case showed that plaintiff 
owned a lot and building thereon on the east side 
of Main street in Springville, Utah. Main street, in 
that city, was also a segment of a transcontinental 
highway. The State Road Commission placed a con-
crete island in the middle of Main street, eliminating 
"U" turns and left turns and denying access of south 
bound Main street traffic to plaintiff's property. The 
evidence further indicated that a new diversion 
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highway permitted south bound traffic, seeking 
plaintiff's property, to travel 1,400 to 1,500 feet fur-
ther than was required to de prior to the placing of 
the island in the middle of Main street. 
An action was brought by plaintiff for Writ of 
Mandamus seeking to require the Road Commission 
to file eminent domain proceedings to assess dam-
ages alleged to have been caused by impairment 
of ingress to and egress from plaintiff's property. 
It is important to note that plaintiff sought no removal 
of the island, but rather chose to recover damages 
for interference for access to his property. 
In regards to whether there was a compensable 
damage, the Supreme Court, in a very definitive 
statement of law, ruled that injury to ingress and 
egress is not a compensable damage. 
The Court stated: 
"In this area of the freeway, citizens must yield to 
the common weal albeit injury to their property may 
result. We espouse the notion that if the sovereign 
exercises its police power reasonably and for the 
good of all the people when constructing highways, 
consequential damages, such as those alleged here 
are not compensable. On the other hand, if public 
officials act arbitrarily and unreasonably, causing, 
for example, total destruction of the means to get in 
and out of one's property without any reasonable 
justification for doing so in the public interest, in a 
manner that imposes a special burden on one not 
shared by the public generally, principles of equity 
no doubt could be invoked to prevent threatened 
action of such character or to remove any instru-
mentality born of such conduct." 
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The Court further stated: 
"If every abutter on a highway or street, where 
proper authority reasonably has eliminated left or 
"U" turns, could obtain damages incident to such 
eventuality, the result is obvious: Highways would 
remain unmarked because of the prohibitive cost 
involved in payment of damages to owners on both 
sides or else they vrnuld be by-passed entirely as 
was in the case of State Road Commission v. Roz-
zelle, which accomplishment we approved. 
"Highways would become increasingly more danger-
ous what with rapidly increasing traffic that has 
evolved in the past years and which clearly will 
increase further. Thousands of miles of highways 
would be left with no traffic control. No city could 
afford the luxury of a one-way street lest it was of 
that type in the inception. Exigencies of the times 
require a practical, sensible approach to the limited-
access highway problem, with the general public 
good being the primary consideration in determin-
ing each case as it arises, every case being different. 
"We believe, conclude, and hold that the plaintiff 
here had no cause of action by way of mandamus, 
and that any damage provable here must yield 
without compensation, in view of the obvious and 
admitted necessity for dividing the subject high-
way in this case." 
CONCLUSION 
It is strongly urged by appellant that the errors 
committed by the trial court pointed out above re-
quire a reversal of the judgment and the ordering 
of a new trial.. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON 
